Maurer School of Law: Indiana University

Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty

Faculty Scholarship

1937

The Multiple Consequences of a Single Criminal Act
Frank Edward Horack Jr.
Indiana University School of Law - Bloomington

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons

Recommended Citation
Horack, Frank Edward Jr., "The Multiple Consequences of a Single Criminal Act" (1937). Articles by Maurer
Faculty. 1202.
https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/1202

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by
Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please
contact rvaughan@indiana.edu.

CONSEQUENCES OF A CRIMINAL ACT

THE MULTIPLE CONSEQUENCES OF A SINGLE
CRIMINAL ACT
By

W

HATEVER

FRANK E.

HORACK, JR.*

may be the intended social objectives of criminal

law enforcement, it is inevitable that in the application of
"the law" to cases, there must be certain determinations as to the
aature of the offense charged, the number of offenses committed,
and the responsibility of the defendant to answer the charges.
Thus, if in a particular situation, D with intent to kill fires a single
shot and kills X and Y it is clear that D is guilty of murder.
But this does not answer the further question, is D guilty of one
or two murders. However obvious tht result of two deaths may
appear, it is not at all clear "in law" that D has committed more
than one murder.
In deciding cases involving this question, courts have announced as significant, the following elements: (1) the act, (2)
the intention, (3) the consequences, and (4) the law. Uncomplicated by rules of practice and procedure,' the question resolves
itself to this: If one of the above elements exists singly, while
the other elements are multiple, does the singularity of the one
element restrict the legal significance of the situation to a single
offense or crime?
So practical a question would require, apparently, a practical,
that is, a certain answer. But sadness must be the lot of the ruleseeker. Even the blackletter-Bishop could do no better than:
"In authority and in reason there is a limit to the right of
multiplying indictments, though the cases are not in distinct
accord as to what it is." '
tAn article on double jeopardy and the multiple consequences of a

criminal act, by Professor James J. Robinson of the Indiana University

School of Law, will appear in the next (December) issue of the LAW
REVIEW. It would have been published in this issue had it not been held
to permit analysis of the decision in the case of State v. Fredlund, (Minn.
May 21, 1937). [ED.]
*Professor of Law, Indiana University.
'The majority of the cases cited in this article arose under a claim
of double jeopardy; consequently much of the discussion relates to
questions of procedure raised by the prosecution's errors or the attempt
to pursue the defendant on a second nisi trial because of the inability
of the state to appeal an original adverse decision. Thus, the language
of the cases is not always directed toward the analysis of the characteristics of the offense, but more frequently refers only to the fairness
of trying the defendant a second time.
-1 Bishop, Criminal Law, 9th ed., 878. Other discussions by the text
writers are not more helpful. See, 1 Wharton, Criminal Law 509;
1 Russell, Crimes 836; 1 Chitty, Criminal Law 451; 4 Blackstone.
Commentaries 336; 2 East, Pleas of the Crown 519; 2 Hale, Pleas of
Crown 241.
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This conclusion seems discouragingly accurate. Indeed, there is
little consistency even in a single jurisdiction. And consistent
results are usually founded on sifting sands of reasoning.
In escaping the judicial quicksands there is temptation to rescue
the cart before the horse, and rationalize cases on the procedural
basis of double jeopardy rather than on the substantive nature of
the offense. Double jeopardy, although it may effectively determine the ability to prosecute a defendant a second time, does not
necessarily support the conclusion that the second prosecution is
barred because no second offense has been committed. Other considerations, such as speed, fairness and orderly criminal law
administration may protect the defendant against a second trial.8
Unfortunately, the analysis of the double offense question is found
chiefly in the jeopardy cases, so that procedural considerations
have bulked large in the development of substantive law.
I
Some consistency appears in the cases when classified 4 according to the type of offense and consequence, and according to the
progressive complexity of the problem as time and action proceed
from diversity and multiplicity to unity and singularity.
THE PHYSICAL INJURY CASES

The physical injury cases may be divided into two fairly
distinct groups-those in which the defendant injures one or
more persons through intended action, and those where injury
is produced through the defendant's unintended but negligent
action.
Very little difficulty exists in homicide prosecutions where
the defendant, at different times and by different acts, produces
injurious consequences to several persons in a manner which
constitutes either the same or different offenses. Thus, if D assaults X today and either assaults or kills Y tomorrow, no one
would suggest that D has committed only one offense, even though
the testimony is clear that his volition was stimulated by the same
general criminal intent. However, if the fact situation is changed
3
See, Miller, Appeals by the State in Criminal Cases, (1927) 36
Yale L. J. 486; Orfield, Federal Criminal Appeals, (1936) 45 Yale
L. J. 1223; Horack, Prosecution AppealS in West Virginia, (1934) 41

W. Va. L. Q. Rev. 50.

4It must be admitted that all classifications are arbitrary and that
arrangements of the cases for other purposes or according to other
"The real trouble begins
elements might produce different classes.
when . . . classes gradually become so familiar . . . that [persons]
believe in the 'existence' of the classes." Bell, The Search for Truth 78.
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only to the extent that the time differential is removed, the problem
becomes one of great nicety. Thus, if D, by several acts, in rapid
succession shoots X and assaults Y, it may be held that he has
committed only one offense,5 but a majority of the cases would
still find dual liability, and procedurally would refuse to permit
the prosecution for the one consequence to be a bar to the prosecution for the second consequence., The same is true if the
offenses are similar rather than dissimilar. 7
The problem becomes more difficult when D by a single act
injures several persons in a fashion which if produced individually
would constitute separate crimes. Thus, if D fires one shot at X
intending to kill him, but kills Y, the court may be called on to
decide whether the "single" act accompanied by the single intention
amounts to an assault with intent to kill and a murder. In this
situation most courts will not permit the prosecution for one
offense to be a bar to the other.8 This seems correct, for if the
original action is for the assault, no reason appears why the
possibility of a murder indictment should bar the assault action.
5
Estep v. State, (1914) 11 Okla. Crim. Rep. 103, 143 Pac. 64;
Williams v. State, (1910) 58 Tex. Crim. App. 193, 125 S. W. 42. Of
course, the question of second indictments for different offenses arising
out of one consequence to one individual is not raised. The cases are
generally in accord that the prosecutor cannot "carve."
"The indictment for one offense does not constitute a bar to an
indictment for a second different offense. Reg v. Gray, (1843) 5 Ir.
L. Rep. 524; State v. Standifer, (1837) 5 Port. (Ala.) 523; Gunter v.
State, (1895) 111 Ala. 23, 20 So. 623; Johnson v. State, (1880) 65 Ga.
94; People v. Stephens, (1921) 297 Ill. 91, 130 N. E. 159; Baker v.
Commonwealth, (1898) 20 Ky. L. Rep. 879, 47 S. W. 864; State v.
Temple, (1905) 194 Mo. 228, 92 S. W. 494; State v. Taylor, (1900) 41
Tex. Cr. App. 564, 55 S. W. 961; Little v. State, (1916) 79 Tex. Cr.
App. 615, 187 S. W. 482.
7
Although some of the cases hold that though the acts are several,
if the offense and consequence is the same, and the occurrence amounts
to one transaction, a second prosecution is not permissible, many cases
reach the opposite result. See Flemister v. United States, (1907) 207
U. S. 372, 28 Sup. Ct 129, 52 L. Ed. 252; Meadows v. State, (1903)
136 Ala. 75, 34 So. 183; Bell v. State, (1915) 120 Ark. 530, 180 S. W.
186; Fews v. State, (1907) 1 Ga. App. 122, 58 S. E. 64; Greenwood
v. State, (1878) 64 Ind. 250; State v. Vines, (1882) 35 La. Ann. 1078;
State v. Roberts, (1930) 170 La. 727, 129 So. 144; Coombs v. Commonwealth, (1935) 259 Ky. 703, 83 S. W. (2d) 46; Commonwealth v. Anderson, (1916) 169 Ky. 372, 183 S. W. 898; People v. Ochtaski, (1898) 115
Mich. 601, 73 N. W. 89; Teat v. State, (1876) 53 Miss. 439; State v.
Nash, (1882) 86 N. C. 650; Morris Y. Territory, (1901) 1 Okla. Cr.
Rep. 617, 101 Pac. 111; State v. Corbett, (1921) 117 S. C. 365, 109
S. E. 133; Alsup v. State, (1932) 120 Tex. Cr. App. 310, 49 S. W. (2d)
749; Ashton v. State, (1893) 31 Tex. Cr. App. 482, 21 S. W. 48.
Contra: Clen v. State, (1873) 42 Ind. 420; Morris v. State, (1917) 16
Ala. App. 34, 75 So. 179.
8
Winn v. State, (1892) 82 Wis. 571, 52 N. W. 775; Alathe v.
Thomas, (1881) 26 Kan. 233.
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The converse is likewise true.9 Whatever the question may be
so far as the procedural problem of double jeopardy is concerned,
the existence of two offenses appears to be beyond dispute.
WVhere the consequences of the single act are similar, the
courts apparently have great difficulty. That is, if D's one shot
kills both X and Y, there is a temptation to say that only a single
murder has been committed. This conclusion, however, seems
without justification. If the death of X is made the basis of
action, no defense would exist because Y was also killed. Nevertheless, numerous jeopardy cases speak as though only one crime
of murder exists in this situation. 10 This is particularly anomalous
when contrasted with the fact situation immediately preceding, for
if the conclusion of some courts is correct, then the defendant
receives greater protection when his act results in two deaths than
he does when his act amounts only to an assault and a homicide.
This anomaly illustrates with particular vigor the error of rationalizing jeopardy cases on the basis of the substantive content of
the crimes involved. Indeed, most of the cases even in this situation find that D may be prosecuted for a second offense. 1
A harder case exists when D's action results in several consequences to the same person. Thus, where D strikes X several
times in rapid succession, the cases are in accord that only one
assault has been made ;12 but when D in the same transaction strikes
X several times with different weapons, the cases have said that
13
each striking is a separate assault.
If by a single act D produces several consequences to a single
person in a fashion which would constitute separate offenses if
done singly, most courts find D guilty of separate offenses. Thus,
9
State v. Damon, (1803) 2 Tyler (Vt.) 387; Sadberry v. State,
(1898)0 39 Tex. Cr. App. 466, 46 S. W. 639.
' "Where the same act of unlawful shooting results in the death
of two persons, an acquittal or conviction on the trial of one would be
a good defense on a second trial for the alleged murder of the other
for the reason that the killing constituted but one crime, which could not
be subdivided and made the basis of two prosecutions. . . ." Gunter v.
State,1 (1895) 111 Ala. 23, 20 So. 623.
Although the act is singular and the offenses are the same if
the consequences are multiple, a second prosecution is permitted; Commonwealth v. Browning, (1912) 146 Ky. 770, 143 S. W. 407; Keeton
v. Commonwealth, (1892) 92 Ky. 522, 18 S. W. 359; Vaughan v. Commonwealth, (1821) W. Va. Cas. 273; State v. Robinson, (1895) 12
Wash. 491, 41 Pac. 884.
12Ellis v. State, (1895) 105 Ala. 74, 17 So. 119; Rex v. Tonks.
[1916) 1 K. B. 443, 114 L. T. 81; Regina v. Morris, (1867) L. R. 1
C. C. R. 90, 16 L. T. 636.
13United States ex rel. Bracey v. Hill, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1935) 77
F. (2d) 970.
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if D shoots at X, he may be prosecuted for the assault and if
subsequently X dies, D may be prosecuted for murder in spite
of the prior prosecution. 14 If, however, the assault prosecution
occurs after his death many courts will bar a subsequent prosecution for murder, but this apparently as much upon the principle
of jeopardy as upon the principle of singularity of offense.' 5
In the negligent homicide cases a different rule has been consistently followed. Thus, where D by the negligent operation of
an automobile runs down and kills more than one person, only a
single prosecution is usually permitted and the dictum of the cases
is that D has committed a single offense only. 1 These cases seem
contrary to cases where death results to two persons as a result
of a single intended act, as where D by one shot kills X and Y.
The apparent difference in the criminality of D's conduct may
provide the explanation.

17

Similar considerations concerning the heinousness of the offense dictate contrary results in the sex cases. Thus, when a
prosecution for abortion is followed by a prosecution for murder
there is no bar,'5 and the same is true if the murder prosecution
is followed by a prosecution for abortion."0 The rule also has been
followed in assault prosecutions after an acquittal for rape. 2 ° This
' 4 Diaz v. United States, (1911) 223 U. S. 442, 32 Sup. Ct. 250,
56 L Ed. 500; Burns v. People, (1848) 1 Park. Crim. (N.Y.) 182;
Regina v. Bird, (1851) 2 Den. 94, T. & M. 437, and when the offenses
are different several prosecutions are permissible. Rex v. Plant, (1836)
7 C. & P. 575; State v. Young, 1 Carolina L. Repositary (N.C.) 509;
State v. Jellison, (1908) 104 Me. 281, 71 At. 716.
IrHolt v. State, (1868) 38 Ga. 187; People v. Cignarale, (1888) 110
N. Y. 23, 17 N. E. 135; Rogers v. Commonwealth, (1935) 257 Ky.
495, 78 S. W. (2d) 340, holding that the prosecution cannot "carve."
'All the cases prohibit a second prosecution for a consequence
produced by a single negligent act: Rex v. William Jennings, (1819)
Russ. and Ry. 388; State v. Wheelock, (1933) 216 Iowa 1428, 250 N. W.
617; State v. Cosgrove, (1926) 103 N. J.L. 412, 135 Atl. 871; Commonwealth v. Veley, (1916) 63 Pa. Super. 489; Commonwealth v. Ernesto,
(1928) 93 Pa. Super. 339; Commonwealth v. McCord, (1935) 116 Pa.
Super. 480, 176 Atl. 834; Smith v. State, (1929) 159 Tenn. 64, 21 S. W.
(2d) 400; People v. Barr, (1929) 259 N. Y. 104, 181 N. E. 64; but a
second prosecution is permitted if a different offense results from a
single negligent act. People v. Herbert, (1935) 6 Cal. (2d) 541, 51 P.
(2d) 456; Commonwealth v. Hones, (1934) 288 Mass. 150, 192 N. E.
522. T
' See, infra, pp. 819-822.
"8Lohman v. People, (1848) 1 N. Y. 379, 4 How. Prac. 445.
"'State v. Elder, (1879) 65 Ind. 282; and the same is true if in
separate counts abortion and murder are charged in the same indictment. People v. Coltrin, (1935) 5 Cal. (2d) 649, 48 P. (2d) 973.
2"Regina v. Dungey, (1864) 4 F. and F. 99; State v. Jesse, (1838)
3 Dev. & B. L. (N.C.) 95; People v. Jameson, (1933) 136 Cal. App.
10, 27 P. (2d) 935; conversely, prosecution for rape may follow prosecution for simple assault. State v. Holm, (1935) 55 Nev. 468, 37 P.
(2d) 821; People v. Saunders, (1859) 4 Park. Crim. (N.Y.) 196.
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on the theory that the elements of the one offense are not necessary
for conviction of the other.2 Where the offense, however, is
there is an
similar, a second prosecution is not permitted unless
22
specified.
acts
the
between
time
of
appreciable lapse
THE PROPERTY CASES

In the property cases dual liability has been imposed infrequently. Thus, where D at one time and with one muscular contraction takes two articles, as two rings, the cases are consistent
in holding a single larceny.22 An exception seems general,
however, when the rings are owned by two different persons.
This exception seems indefensible if larceny is a crime against
possession rather than against ownership.24
Many factual distinctions might be drawn in these cases.
Thus, if D takes with one muscular contraction a sack containing
a dozen eggs, it is hard to imagine liability for twelve petty
larcenies. When D, with a single intention, takes twelve eggs by
twelve muscular contractions, twelve larcenies would be committed if some of the homicide cases were controlling. The decisions, however, do not sustain this position. 25 But this seems to
be a question of convenience in prosecution rather than a result of
distinction in the character of the offense. Thus it might be advantageous to the defendant to allege several offenses, for by
dividing the transaction according to its consequences he could
produce several petty larcenies, and avoid the heavier sanctions of
felony punishment.
21

"The offense of assault and battery was not an offense necessarily
included in the information. . . . The offense of assault and battery
was an entirely different offense, in that it lacked the essential element
of an attempt to criminally know the prosecutrix under the age of
nineteen years, which constitutes rape." State v. Holm, (1935) 55 Nev.
468, 37 P. (2d) 821.
22Ex parte Brown, (1934) 139 Kan. 614, 32 P. (2d) 507; People
(1935) 2 Cal. (2d) 693, 43 P. (2d) 539.
v. Lachek,
23
Regina v. Brettel, (1842) Car. & M. 609; Wilson v. State, (1876)
45 Tex. 76; Hudson v. State, (1880) 9 Tex. App. 151; Commonwealth
v. Andrews, (1807) 2 Mass. 409; State v. McCormack, (1880) 8 Or.
236. See also, Turner's Case, (1674) Kel. C. C. 30, 1065; Rex v. Vandercomb, (1796) 2 Leach 708, 2 East, P. C. 519.
24Stone's Case, (1562) 2 Dyer 214; Wilson v. State, (1876) 45
Tex. 76; Alexander v. State, (1886) 21 Tex. Crim. App. 406, 170 S. W.
139; Commonwealth v. Andrews, (1807) 2 Mass. 409. But where the
act violates the possession of several persons, several prosecutions should
be permitted, as in Orcutt v. State, (1931) 52 Okla. Crim. Rep. 167,
3 P. (2d) 912; State v. Thurston, (1842) 2 McMul. (S.C.) 382;
State2 v. Emery, (1896) 68 Vt. 109, 34 Atl. 432.
5See, Regina v. Brettel, (1842) Car. & M. 609; State v. McCormack, (1880) 8 Or. 236.
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When D's act constitutes different property offenses against the
same possession, the tendency is to preserve the state's right of
prosecution for each offense, the same as in the personal injury
cases. 20 This is particularly true when the offenses charged are
"statutory crimes."
MISCELLANEOUS OFFENSES

Numerous statutory offenses involving the question of dual
liability for a single act have received judicial interpretation. The
courts either find that the statute specifically provides for the
punishment of each consequence,2 7 or else that the defendant's act
violates different statutes, so that the case does not come within
the "same act and offense" rule.281 The liquor offenses consistently
impose dual liability.2 9

criminal libel,
same result.

31

Most of the cases involving tax evasions,30

forgery,32 and motor vehicle violations 33 reach the

2

6Rex v. Henderson, (1841) Carr. & K. 328; Rex v. King, (1896)
75 L. T. 392; Rex v. Vandercomb, (1796) 2 Leach 708, 2 East, P. C.
708; People v. Dukes, (1934) 2 Cal. App. (2d) 698, 38 P. (2d) 805;
People v. Moon, (1935) 7 Cal. App. (2d) 96, 45 P. (2d) 384; State
v. Smith, (1934) 219 Iowa 168, 256 N. W. 651; People v. Powers,

(1935) 272 Mich. 303, 261 N. W. 543; Phillips v. State, (1887) 85 Tenn.

551, 3 S. W. 434.

But see, Turner's Case, (1674)

Kil. C. C. 30;

Dixon
27 v. State, (1934) 169 Miss. 876, 154 So. 290.
State v. Ainsworth, (1839) 11 Vt. 91; Shirley v. Commonwealth
(1911) 143 Ky. 183, 136 S. W. 227; Woodworth v. State, (1916) 185
Ind. 28
582, 114 N. E. 86.
United States v. Goldsmith, (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1933) 68 F. (2d)
5; Bedell v. United States, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1935) 78 F. (2d) 358;
Ex parte Rhinelander, (D.C. Tex. 1935) 11 F. Supp. 298; State v.
Fife, (1828) 1 Bailey (S.C.) 1; Commonwealth v. Vaughan, (1897) 101Ky. 603, 42 S. W. 117; Ragsdale v. State, (1934) 126 Tex. Cr. App.
538, 272 S. W. (2d) 257.
-1Prosecution on same act but under different statute permitted: State v.
Inners, (1866) 53 Me. 536; Commonwealth v. Vaughan, (1897) 101
Ky. 603, 42 S. W. 117; Ragsdale v. State, (1934) 126 Tex. Cr. App.
538, 72 S. W. (2d) 257; State v. Kelley, (1934) 219 Iowa 1305, 253
N. W. 49. But see, People v. Burkhardt, (1935) 5 Cal. (2d) 641, 50
P. (2d)
97; Arrol v. State, (1934) 207 Ind. 321, 192 N. E. 440.
3
"United States v. Wexter, (C.C.A. 2d. Cir. 1935) 79 F. (2d) 526.
31
Rex v. Benfield, (1760) 2 Burr. 980, (singing libellous songs);
also, Rex v. Young, (1914) 32 N. Z. L. Rep. 1191 (inciting persons and

sedition); McIntosh v. State, (1902) 16 Ga. 543, 42 S. E. 793 (vulgar
and abusive language); People v. Sheik, (1926) 75 Cal. App. 421, 243
P. 39.
32State
v. Klugherg, (1904) 91 Minn. 406, 98 N. W. 99 (making
and uttering forged instrument); People v. Menne, (1935) 4 Cal. App.
(2d) 91, 41 P. (2d) 383 (conspiracy and issuing bad checks; Estup v.
State, (1914) 11 Okla. Cr. Rep. 103, 143 Pac. 64 (embezzlement of
public funds); Curtis v. United States (C.C.A. 10th Cir. 1933) 67 F.
(2d) 943 (false bank entries); People v. Bain, (1934) 358 Ill. 177, 193
N. E. 137 (conspiracy and receiving bank deposits while insolvent);
State v. Coblentz, (1935) 169 Md. 159, 180 Atl. 266 (receiving deposits
while33insolvent).
Welton v. Taneborne, (1908) 99 L. T. 668 (dangerous driving

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

II
The decisions give only partial warning of the conflict in the
reasoning of the courts.
THE SINGLE INTENT THEORY

In general the courts have said that if the consequence of the
defendant's action is referable to a single criminal intent, the defendant is answerable for only one offense." But this has not
always been the law. Compensation both to the state and to the
injured family made the earliest criminal law economic rather
3"
than moral-relate to consequences rather than intention.

Only

after the establishment of christianity in England did the moral
30

standard of "sin" become the measure of criminal responsibility.
And even so, as late as 1487 it was said in a Yearbook case that
"the intent of a man will not be tried, for the Devil himself knoweth
'
But the moral standard dominated, and
not the intent of man.'11
intention became the measure of crime.
This test, of course, was not absolute.

If intent alone was

sufficient, then both action and consequence would have been unnecessary, but it is well understood that save for the law of attempts, both act and consequence must concur with intention.38
and exceeding 20 miles per hour); State v. Phillips, (1934) 179 Wash.
607, 38 P. (2d) 372; Londers v. State, (1935) 26 Ala. App. 506, 162 So.
550 (drunken and reckless driving; larceny and taking motor vehicle without permission) ; People v. Burkhardt, (1935) 5 Cal. (2d) 641, 50 P. (2d)
97 (public intoxication and drunken driving); Ragsdale v. State, (1934)
126 Tex. Cr. App. 538, 72 S. W. (2d) 257 (drunken driving and transporting intoxicating liquor).
34"At first view, it appears as if there were two crimes distinctly,
indictable and punishable. But our sense of justice is shocked by the
idea, that a man shall be convicted and punished for the arson, with that
measure of punishment which the law metes out to those guilty of that
crime; and that afterwards for perfectly accidental and involuntary killing,
he shall be liable to the same punishment of death which is inflicted on
the wilful and malicious murderer. In the case before us, the killing was
a simple consequence of the burning, and there is no pretense that it was,
in point of fact, intentional. The law makes a man responsible for even
the unexpected consequences of his crimes, and for this purpose, imputes
the intention to produce the consequences, as well as the original act. But
to constitute a crime there must be an act of the will, and imputed intent
must have real intent as its basis; not to accomplish the precise result, but
to do something." State v. Cooper, (1833) 13 N. J. L. 361.
35
See, Attenborough, Laws of Earliest English Kings 145; Robertson,
Laws of the Kings of England.
36
See, Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law 220.
3717 Edward IV 2.
38
Beale, Criminal Attempts, (1903) 16 Harv. L. Rev. 491; Sayre,
Criminal Attempts, (1928) 41 Harv. L. Rev. 821; Arnold, (1930) 40 Yale
L. J. 53.

CONSEQUENCES OF A CRIMINAL ACT

Although intention usually refers to mens rea or to specific intent, in some cases it is used to mean "volition to act" and in
others to mean the foreseeability of the consequences of action.
These variations, while useful in "explaining" particular decisions,
complicate and confuse the general structure of criminal liability.
Thus, it is little more than conjecture that if D does one act he
does it with one intent, while if he "simultaneously" does two
acts, he acts with two intents. The "number of intents," both as
an evidentiary and as a psychological problem, seems more for the
conjurer than for the judges.
The denial of multiple liability in the criminal negligence cases
apparently supports the validity of the "single intent" theory.' 9
But even in these cases, the defendant is "negligent" toward each
person injured, even though there is in fact no "intent" to harm
any one. Thus, irrespective of the intentional or unintentional
character of the harm, there is no denying that any of the consequences can be made the basis of the prosecution. Consequently
it is difficult to understand why the prosecution of one consequence
amounts to a prosecution for all the consequences.
One explanation is that "it is the character of the act, not the
consequences which flow from it, which determines the question
of the guilt or innocence of the person who does it.""0 "Character"
as used here (with consequences eliminated) means intention. Thus
if intention is the dominant element, it is not inconsistent to say
that "A series of shots may constitute one act, in the legal sense,
where they are fired with one volition." 4' 1 To say this is merely to
limit liability solely to the number of intentions with which the
defendant acts.
But there has been no uniformity in the application of the
single intention test. Where the act and intent is single, but the
consequences amount to different offenses, two prosecutions are
'42
generally permitted because the "act and offense are not identical
4
2
or because "there is no identity of offense."
The permission of
3"See,
40

supra, note 16.
State v. Rosa, (1905) 72 N. J. L. 462, 62 Atl. 695.
v. State, (1918) 83 Tex. Cr. App. 418, 203 S. W. 357.
42Spinnell
Offenses must be the same in law and in fact: People v. Helbing.
41

(1882) 61 Cal. 620; Commonwealth v. Roby, (1832) 12 Pick. (Mass.)
496; State v. Magone, (1899) 33 Or. 570, 56 Pac. 648; People v. Saunders.
(1859) 4 Park. Crim. (N.Y.) 196; Winn v. State, (1892) 82 Wis. 571.

52 N. W. 775; or the act and crime must be identical; People v. Majors.

(1884) 65 Cal. 138, 133 Pac. 29; Taylor v. State, (1900) 109 Ga. 790,
35 S.43E. 161; Smith v. Commonwealth, (1895) 98 Ky. 1, 32 S. W. 137.
"To constitute this [former conviction] a good defense, the offense

must be identical or necessarily included the one within the other." State
v. Parish, (1855) 8 Rich L. (S.C.) 322. Rex v. Emden, (1808) 9 East
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the second prosecution in these cases denies significance to the
"single intention." If difference in consequences will permit several actions because there are "several intentions," then if the
consequences are multiple but produce "similar offenses," it seems
only consistent to say that there are still "several intentions." Yet
a second prosecution is not permitted. Under these circumstances
it seems difficult to justify a distinction (except on a procedural
ground) between similar and dissimilar consequences of a single
act and intent. Thus, the reasoning of Regina v. Gray,4 seems
more accurate. There the court said,
"Suppose that there was only one shot.., the conclusion does
not follow that there was but one offense. There are two distinct
offenses. The pleader has changed the word 'act' into 'transaction,'
but the same act may contain a number of crimes against several
persons. . . . Here there was but one transaction, yet there were
two persons against whom the act was committed."
The real issue in the cases is the extent of and the manner in
which the defendant may be asked to respond to criminal liability.
In determining this question neither intention nor action are of
primary significance. Character of the consequence, the time lapse
between "several acts" and the more inchoate standards of the
social responsibility of the defendant to society play interacting
parts. An attempt to rationalize the cases on a single element of
the criminal offense leads to conflicting and inconsistent results.

THE SINGLE ACT THEORY
One of the delightfully delusive maxims of criminal law is the
necessity of act and intent for criminal responsibility. Used negatively, it is supposed to defend the proposition that for a single
act there can be but singular criminal responsibility. Thus, it is
said that
"where the same act of unlawful shooting results in the death
of two persons, an acquittal or conviction on the trial of one would
be a good defense on a second trial for the alleged murder of the
other for the reason that the killing constituted but one crime,
which could not be subdivided and made the basis of two prosecutions .... "4
437; United States v. Nickerson (1854) 17 How. (U.S.) 204, 15 L. Ed.
219; Freeman v. State, (1889) 119 Ind. 501, 21 N. E. 1101; Wilson v.

State, (1855) 24 Conn. 57.
44(1843) 5 Ir. L. Rep. 524.
45
Gunter v. State, (1895) 111 Ala. 23, 20 So. 632; Womack v. State,
(1870) 7 Cold. (Tenn.) 508; but the exceptions are numerous: (1).
Thus if one act violates the criminal laws of different sovereigns the
responsibility is multiple. Grafton v. United States, (1907) 206 U. S.
333, 27 Sup. Ct. 749, 51 L. Ed. 1084; Moore v. Illinois, (1852) 14 How.
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The term "act," however, is ambiguous, and is often used in
a dual sense. The most frequent confusion is between the "physical
act," or muscular contraction of the defendant and the "consequence" which results. All too frequently "act" is a conclusion
as to the multiplicity or singularity of responsibility, and the discussions of the cases shed little light on the significance of the act
itself.
As a constant factor in the determination of criminal responsibility "act" should mean that the defendant has produced with
one volition the muscular contraction which may or may not
result in a consequence alleged to be criminal. Narrowed to this
point, the significance of the act is primarily factual, and we
cannot now include in the concept of act the idea of intention or
the reasonableness or unreasonableness of foreseeing multiple consequence. With this restricted meaning, it is difficult to understand why a different responsibility should attach to the same
consequences merely because they were produced by two acts
instead of one. Indeed it was asserted in Gunter z. State, that it
is difficult
"to say that two shots fired in quick succession by the same hand,
with the same intention, impelled by the same motive, but resulting in the death of two persons, constitute two crimes; whereas
one single shot fired with the same single intention impelled by
the same single motive, and accomplishing the same result constitutes but one crime. .

.."4'

Such a distinction is, indeed, indefensible. But it is not
obvious that only one crime resulted. The legal significance of
"the same hand" should not be great. The significance of singleness of intent "and/or" motive can hardly be greater! And the
importance of one rather than two muscular contractions is impossible to understand. Divorced from the objective of criminal
law, no reason appears for saying that liability, single or multiple,
could be existent.
The single act theory is in reality a single result or single
consequence theory. When stated thus, it becomes not a test of
the defendant's action but of the foreseeability of the consequence
of the action. At least in the intended crimes this is an anomaly.
Where D intends a particular act, he is held for the single con(U.S.) 13, 14 L. Ed. 306; (2) or if the consequences of the act constitute
several different offenses, supra nn. 42, 43; (3) or, in some jurisdictions, if
the same offense is committed against different persons. State v. Nash,
(1852) 86 N. C. 650; People v. Brannon, (1925) 70 Cal. App. 225, 233
Pac. 88; Reg. v. Gray, (1843) 5 Ir. L. Rep. 524.
41(1895) 111 Ala. 23, 20 So. 632.
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sequences of his action even though it was not foreseeable.47 But if
the consequences are multiple, his liability apparently is tested
singly on the theory that he could foresee but one harm from one
act, or that he "intended but one consequence. ' 48 There appears
to be no reason why absolute liability for single consequences
should exist, but not for multiple consequences.
There is even less reason in the case of unintended criminal
action. If it is assumable that the rules of criminal negligence
pattern after tort rules-then several similar consequences are
as foreseeable as a single consequence and probably more foreseeable than several different consequences. Yet liability attaches
in the last two situations, but not in the first.4 9 There is some
intimation that if the unintended consequence results from an act
which is itself criminal, the liability is greater than if the consequence is produced by an act which is criminal only because of
the character of the action. If foreseeability is an element of criminal responsibility, this is a justifiable distinction, for in the first
situation the probability of unsocial consequences is the basis for
treating the act itself as criminal.
The larceny cases frequently have been cited in support of the
single act theory. Their applicability, however, may be questioned.
Save for a few cases,50 the taking has been from the possession
of a single individual. Thus if the crime of larceny is a crime
"against possession," in these situations there has been not only
one act, but also only one consequence. 5' And the cases which
impose dual liability when the property is in single possession but
has dual ownership seem erroneous, 52 on the ground that the law
against larceny is not a protection of ownership but of possession.
A resum6 of the cases suggests that the single act theory de47
Gores' Case, (1911) 9 Coke 81, 853; but see Regina v. Serne, (1887)
16 Cox
48 C. C. 311.
"If by separate shots the defendant wounded two persons, the transaction would be single if the shooting was done in repelling a joint assault.
• . . The intent of the defendant determines the matter." Burnam v.

State, (1907) 2 Ga. App. 295, 58 S. E. 683; see also, Fews v. State, (1907)

1 Ga. App. 122, 58 S. E. 64; Robbin v. State, (1922) 29 Ga. App. 214,
144 S. E. 581; State v. Elder, (1879) 65 Ind. 282.
49See, supra n. 10 and 16, but see n. 11.
5
OTurners Case, (1674) Kel. C. C. 30; Commonwealth v. Andrews,
(1807) 2"Mass. 409; Commonwealth v. Wade, (1825) 17 Pick. (Mass.)
395; Phillips v. State, (1887) 85 Tenn. 551, 35 S. W. 434; Wright v.
State, (1884) 17 Tex. App. 152; Morgan v. State, (1871) 34 Tex. 677;
Rifle v. Commonwealth, (1900) 21 Ky. L. Rep. 1331, 56 S. W. 265. And
note that in all of these cases where the possession of more than one person
was violated a second prosecution was not barred.
51
But see, Morgan v. State, (1871) 34 Tex. 677.
52
See, Miller, Criminal Law 346-8.
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pends not on the analysis of "the act" but rather upon the foreseeability of its consequences. Foreseeability may be a defensible
limit upon criminal liability, as it is in tort cases, but the number
of muscular contractions which produce the consequence seems
unimportant. In foreseeability the quality of the act would
appear more significant. One muscular contraction necessary to
explode a bomb would normally create a wider responsibility than
several muscular contractions necessary to strike several persons.
But this is a shift of emphasis from act to consequence.
The single act theory is most frequently used in the cases not
as a factual description but as a legal conclusion. Courts frequently speak as though the defendant had done but a single "legal
act" when in fact he has produced several muscular contractions.
The basis of these decisions is that only one breach of the peace
has occurred, and for that breach there should be only one liability.

3

The single act theory is only an explanation of single liability.
These modern cases lose sight of the historical background of
criminal law, wherein the interest in the life of each individual
either as a soldier or a member of the economic unit entitled the
state to a criminal action for each individual injury. This concept
has not been entirely abandoned in the law today.
Where a single act results in widely separated consequences,
as where D's felonious burning of a building destroyed property
54
and injured or destroyed life, dual prosecutions are permitted.
In this situation the act is of little significance. In short, the
single act is but an inartistic way of granting or refusing second
liability. And that liability depends upon a judgment more extensive than the muscular contraction of the defendant.
Where in one violation of the peace several acts occur the courts
abandon the single act test for the "same transaction test."55 There
53
"This is not a question between either of the persons injured by
the assault and battery, . . . but it is a question between the government
and its subject, . . . the indictment charges the defendant with having
disturbed the public peace by assaulting and wounding one of its citizens.
For this crime he shows that he has been legally convicted. . . ." (Italics
ours.) State v. Damon, (1803) 2 Tyler (Vt.) 387. To the same effect,
see, Rex v. Benfield, (1760) 2 Bun. 980, Commonwealth v. Vely, (1916)
63 Pa.
54 Super. 489; Commonwealth v. Ernesto, (1928) 93 Pa. Super. 339.
People v. Grzesczak, (1912) 77 Misc. Rep. 202, 137 N. Y. S. 538;
State v. Bobbitt, (1910) 228 Mo. 252, 128 S. W. 953; but see State v.
Cooper, (1833) 13 N. J. L. 361; Regina v. Horsey, (1862) 3 F. and F.
287; Regina v. Serne, (1887) 16 Cox C. C. 311.
55
, Wilcox v. State, (1880) 6 Lea (Tenn.) 571; State v. Colgate, (1884)
31 Kan. 511; Holt v. State, (1868) 38 Ga. 187; People v. Grzesczak, (1912)
77 Misc. Rep. 202, 137 N. Y. S. 538. But see Womack v. State, (1890) 7
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is but a different way of stating that liability is no more extensive
than the number of violations of the peace which occur. The
application of the same transaction test denies importance to the
muscular contraction of the defendant. Thus, whether D kills
X and Y with one or two shots is unimportant, if all occurred at
approximately the same time. This test sub silentio shifts the
test of offense from act to time.
So far as theory is concerned, the same transaction test is no
improvement over the tests of act or intention, for what constitutes
the same transaction now depends upon act, intention, and time.
It has one advantage, however, in that it tends to force a consideration simultaneously of all the factors which are necessary for
criminal liability. Its weakness is that it makes liability a question
primarily of time rather than of the purpose of law enforcement.
It assumes, as the intent and act theory assumes, that the interest
of the state is only in keeping the peace. If the interest of the
state is in placing criminal sanctions against particular activities
which injure the constituent members of the state, then the same
transaction theory is not useful. Thus, it appears that all of the
standard substantive determinations of the characteristics of a
criminal offense depend upon a prior assumption concerning the
nature of criminal law enforcement.
TIME AND CONSEQUENCE

Although seldom mentioned by the cases, the number of consequences which result from single or closely related activity is
perhaps most significant. In one sense every act produces multiple
consequences. That is, the consequence which affects the particular individual, the relation between the individual and other individuals, and the consequence which affects the peace and order of
society. It is on this theory that the act which violates several
protected interests is said to give rise to several consequences and
several offenses.5"
Closely associated with dual consequence is the question of
time, for there appears to be no case where there has been a denial
of second liability if an appreciable time elapsed between several
muscular contractions. When the time lapse is small or relatively
Cold. (Tenn.) 508. "In order the two acts of felonius killing may constitute a single offense of murder, something more is necessary than that

they should have been committed upon the same occasion, or in the
progress of the same affray." See also, Moss v. State, (1917) 16 Ala.
App.5634, 75 So. 179.
See Regina v. Gray, (1843) 5 Ir. L. Rep. 524 and cases cited supra
notes 6, 7, 11.
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non-existent, its significance is primarily evidentiary, i.e., there
is evidence of only one act and one intent, and thus, ex hypothesis
one offense.
This denial of dual responsibility on the basis of time is unsound. It bases prosecution on breach of the peace rather than
upon the result of the criminal activity. If this is true, then when
one "breach of the peace" results in the invasion of several different interests, there should be one liability. Numerous cases,
however, deny this result. 7 This is particularly true in the statutory offenses. 8 The same result should be reached in the "common
law crimes." Not only do they have a statutory basis today,
but the requirement of specific intent should impose a higher
responsibility than that required in the more recent enactments
where specific intent is seldom an element.
POLICY
However useful the theories of offense may be in relieving a
defendant from a second prosecution, these theories do not aid in
deciding what an offense is or should be. The character of an
offense depends upon the philosophy or theory of the purpose of
criminal responsibility. Thus, although an act, an intention, and
a consequence are said to be necessary for criminal liability, they
are not necessarily so. That is, liability could be imposed if there
was a consequence even though there was neither an intention nor
an act (as in the case of an omission); or liability could be imposed without intention or consequence. The only reason that
all three elements have been required is because of the belief that
they are useful in determining the ambit of criminal responsibility.
It is time that inquiry be made into the assumption that these
elements are of the same importance in determining single or
multiple responsibility, as they are in determining the existence of
a single offense. The addition of the time element in the multiple
offense problem appears important, but it has not been discussed, as
such, by the cases. Its importance depends upon the general objectives of criminal liability, and our demands for fairness in criminal
prosecution.
These objectives have not remained at all times the same.
Numerous considerations which gave rise to the jeopardy rule no
longer exist in our society. Originally the interest of the state
67Regina v. Gray, (1843)

notes 6, 7 and 11.
5
sSupra nn. 27-33.

5 Ir. L. Rep. 524 and cases cited supra
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was in the life or security of each individual and the number
of harms resulting from a defendant's act was a measure of his
liability. The abandonment of this theory for the breach of the
peace rule gave emphasis to the singularity of individual responsi' ! :14
bility.
The severity of criminal punishment in England when offenses
were chiefly capital placed pressure on the courts to restrict liability. Thus, if a defendant was convicted, unless he was protected by his clergy,59 the problem of a second trial did not existthe defendant was hanged. If the defendant was acquitted, the
court's reluctance for a second risk on the defendant's life gave
rise to the jeopardy rule, which was easily confusable with the
proposition that the defendant had committed but one offense.
Likewise, the demand for perfection in pleading encouraged the
court to say that the state forfeited its right to a second trial if it
made a mistake. Again the purpose was to protect the defendant's
life.
Many of these considerations are now of little significance in
our social order. Public violence, despite recent dramatic incidents, gives the state less concern than untoward practices destructive of the general economy of government and injurious to the
economic integrity of its citizens. Today the body of criminal law
constantly grows toward the protection of individual interests as
an auxiliary of tort liability, and the physical harm cases become
proportionately less significant.
The enforcement of liability has likewise undergone radical
change. Although in the beginning death was the normal punishment for the common law felonies, today, few offenses are of a
capital character. Indeed, even where long prison sentences are
permissible under the statutes, the cry of every prosecutor is
that punishment is inadequate.60 Thus, the demand for singularity
of offense as a means of protecting the defendant against excessive
punishment has lost much of its significance. Today, the possibility of a multiple prosecution as a means of obtaining an adequate
punishment holds attractive possibilities.
59Borought & Halcraft's Case, (1579) 2 Leon. 160. "In cases of
murder, a conviction of an inferior offense, as manslaughter, and the
allowance of clergy, is, in one respect, more beneficial than a total acquittal,
because it is a bar to any subsequent appeal." Stone's case, (1562) 2
Dyer60214.
1n the case of counterfeiting, for example, although the maximum
possible imprisonment is fifteen years, the most usual sentence (during
a two year period) was one year and a day; only one maximum sentence
was imposed; and over eighty-five percent of the imprisonments were for
less than three years.
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Furthermore, the general economic inability of individuals to
prosecute, through private action, claims for injury has stimulated
the expansion of criminal offenses as a means of control where
civil liability has become ineffective. Thus, the inclusion of
criminal penalties as a sanction for such economic interests as
arise under fair trade acts, blue sky laws, pure food and drug
acts, reflect the government's responsibility in the protection of
individual interests. In these cases multiplicity of prosecution is
generally accepted. Thus, it appears that our society is demanding
of government many of the protections which are more referable to
the feudal or pre-feudal English society than to the classic era of
the nineteenth century.
Although the procedural demands of criminal prosecution
originally were conceived as burdensome to the defendant, today
the belief is that the "technicalities" of procedure provide ready
opportunity for the defendant's escape. Consequently, the denial
of a second prosecution because of an error in the first trial seems
today to have less validity than it once did, and the abrogation of
common law procedure, particularly in regard to the indictment and
state appeals, illustrates the shift in belief concerning the defendant's need for protection. When the jeopardy rule is looked
upon as a "technicality" by which guilty men frequently escape
well merited punishment, it is to be expected that courts will be
more willing to permit second prosecutions for multiple consequences as a means of promoting "the ends of justice."
With a recession in the importance of the common law conceptions of criminal prosecution, it well may be considered whether
or not our conception of an offense will not tend to develop in a
fashion which will include "consequence" as an element of equal
significance with act and intention. The lack of a time interval,
by which it is now argued that as only a single breach of the peace
has occurred there is only single responsibility, likewise may be
abandoned for a definition of offense which will more definitely
accord with the changing use of the criminal sanction in social
control.
Such an increase of criminal responsibility necessarily involves
the question of criminal procedure. The advantage of the single
act system was not limited to the protection of the defendant, but
also relieved the judicial system of repetitious litigation. The
application of the indictment system used in statutory offenses
to common law crimes would meet this difficulty. Thus, in a single
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prosecution arising from a "single" transaction, by the inclusion of
separate offenses in separate counts, the entire transaction might
be adjudicated, and all criminal responsibility assessed against the
defendant at one time. This method has proved useful in civil
litigation, and is well understood in prosecutions for federal statutory offenses. Thus, procedurally there would appear to be no
objection to the recognition in a single case of criminal offenses
as extensive as the consequences of the action.
An extension of the procedural protection of double jeopardy
has done much to confuse understanding concerning the exact
character of an offense. To say that if D kills X and Y with one
shot, then he has murdered X or Y but not X and Y, is difficult to
understand. It is likewise hard to believe that the courts intend
to grant the defendant a bonus by protecting him in case his second
consequence is similar to his first. Thus, to say that if D assaults
X and kills Y with one shot he may be tried twice, but that if his
aim is more certain and he kills both X and Y with one shot he
is guilty of but one murder, smacks of the grotesque. A more
careful consideration of the problem suggests the validity of the
statement that
"A battery is violence done to the person of another and though
there be but a single act of violence committed, yet if its consequence affects two or more persons there must be a corresponding
number of distinct offenses perpetrated."'"
Carefully analyzed, there appears no obstacle, as a matter of
substantive law, to the prosecution of each consequence of a
criminal act.
61
State v. Nash, (1882) 86 N. C. 650; see also, People v. Brannon,
(1925) 70 Cal. App. 225, 233 Pac. 88.

